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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j), as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment awarding two 
parcels of land to the Holdens under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed 
de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6P.3d 1129. 
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: With respect to the South parcel (the 
strip) of property, this issue was addressed by the Aults in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 331). Objection to 
inclusion of the west parcel was made at oral argument and in response to the proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 499 1 6, R. 501). 
2. Did the judgment signed by the district court erroneously state that the 
Holdens were entitled to the disputed property because the Aults' deed failed to close, 
and because Aults' warranty deed was subject to the Holdens alleged rights of 
possession? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed 
de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129. 
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PRESERVATION IN RECORD: This issue was addressed below by the Aults in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
331). 
3. Did the district court err in concluding that no material issue of fact 
existed with respect to the Aults' claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and 
trespass? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's order granting summary judgment 
with respect to the Aults' other causes of actions is reviewed de novo by this Court. 
Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129. 
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: This issue was addressed by the Aults 
in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
331), and in objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 
501). 
4. Did the trial judge err in awarding attorney's fees against the Aults 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the Aults' Complaint was without merit is 
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Pennington v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). A finding of bad faith is a question of fact 
regarding subjective intent, which is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Id. Whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are 
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sufficient is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998). 
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: Attorney fees were mentioned 
by the Holdens in their answer to the complaint and in the submission of proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which the Aults objected. (R.22-16, 498 
1 3). 
5. Did the trial judge err in awarding costs to the Holdens? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A challenge to an award of costs based upon 
timeliness or insufficiency of description is a question of law reviewed de novo. Lyon 
v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 1 77, 5 P.3d 616. 
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: The Aults filed a timely 
Objection to the Holdens' memorandum of costs. (R. 537). 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.] 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d). 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in 
a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
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appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than 
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide 
the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the 
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, 
a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements 
in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified 
stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A 
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of 
the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the 
court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served 
and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On November 30, 1998, the Aults filed a complaint against the Holdens in the 
Third District Court in and for Tooele County. The complaint set forth four causes of 
action: (1) quiet title, (2) conversion of personal property, (3) unjust enrichment, and 
(4) trespass. (R. 7). The Holdens filed an answer to the complaint which denied the 
four causes of action and requested that the complaint be dismissed and the Holdens be 
awarded "their costs and expenses." (R. 22-16). The Holdens subsequently filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings which was denied. 
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Following discovery by the parties, the Holdens filed a motion for summary 
judgment on February 8, 2000. (R. 279). On June 5, 2000, oral argument was heard 
on the Holdens' motion for summary judgment. Judge Young indicated that he would 
grant the Holdens' motion for summary judgment twice during the argument (R. 810 at 
24, 29), but decided that he would further consider the matter and took the decision 
under advisement (R. 810 at 26, 30). 
On June 20, 2000, the trial court granted summary judgment and issued a 
Memorandum Decision. (R. 489; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 1). Counsel for 
the Holdens, Parker M. Nielson, prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Summary Judgment for Judge Young's signature. The Holdens' attorney, 
Parker Nielson, filed a withdrawal of counsel on June 29, 2000. (R. 495). The Aults' 
filed objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Summary 
Judgment and a request for oral argument, but on July 18, 2000, the Court signed the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Summary Judgment (R. 515, 517; 
Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 2) and entered a written order entitled "Ruling" 
which denied oral argument and the objections, and entered the signed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment order. (R. 508; Addendum of the Appellee 
Exhibit 1). The Aults timely filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2000. (R. 526). 
The final Summary Judgment contained an award of attorney fees and costs to 
Holdens. (R. 517). On July 18, 2000, the court clerk mailed a copy of the "Ruling" to the 
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Aults' attorney and Holdens' former attorney, Parker Nielsen. (R. 507). On July 26, 2000, 
the Holdens received a letter from Parker Nielsen, dated July 25, 2000, which enclosed the 
"Ruling" from the Court. (R. 550). This letter was the first notice the Holdens received of the 
entry of the order. (R. 547). 
On August 1, 2000, the Holdens, pro se, filed the Verified Memorandum of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs. (R. 523; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 3). On August 17, 2000, 
the Defendants, through their new counsel, Scott A. Broadhead, requested an extension of 
time to file the Memorandum of Costs. (R. 549). The Aults objected to the memorandum 
of costs. Subsequently, the Holdens' former attorney, Parker Nielsen, filed a Motion 
for Order Fixing Amount of Attorney Fees (R. 564). Over the Aults' objections and 
denying the Aults' request for oral argument, Judge Young awarded the Holdens' 
$3,518.65 in costs and granted the motion awarding the Holdens $13,550.00 in 
attorney fees. (R. 804, 807). The Aults timely filed a notice of appeal on November 3, 
2000. (R. 812). The two cases were consolidated by order of this Court on December 
12, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December 1962, the Aults purchased the property known as the John C. 
Sharp home and farm in Vernon, Utah from Clarence M. Plant and Anna M. Plant 
Ross pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, which was filed with the Tooele 
County Recorder's Office in 1962. (R. 253; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 4). 
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Upon payment in full of the purchase price, a warranty deed was executed by Plant and 
Ross on June 15, 1972, and was recorded by the Aults on August 22, 1975 (R. 256; 
Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 5). 
In 1969, the Holdens began leasing the property on the south adjacent to the 
Aults' property. On March 21, 1973, the Holdens purchased this property. Holdens 
hold a warranty deed dated March 21, 1973, recorded with the Tooele County 
Recorder on April 9, 1973. (R. 13, 515; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 6). The 
warranty deed to the Aults property is dated June 15, 1972 and recorded subsequent to 
the recording of Holdens' deed with the Tooele County Recorder on August 22, 1975. 
(R. 515). On February 26, 1976, the Holdens purchased a thin, triangular piece of 
property from Don Gowans. (R. 248 1f5, 515). This property is adjacent on the west 
to the Aults' and the Holdens' properties (Figure 1, highlighted in blue). 
Based upon the deeds of the Aults and Holdens, on July 5, 1998, the Aults had 
the property which is the subject of the dispute surveyed by D.H. Jensen and 
Associates, Inc. ("Jensen Survey" herein). (Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 7). 
The Aults's warranty deed describes the property by metes and bounds as follows: 
A parcel of land beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the 
Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter 
of Section 29 in Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake 
Meridian, thence East 9.10 chains (600.601), to the center of the 
county road, thence North along the center of said County Road, 
4.47 chains (295.02'), thence West 5.73 chains (378.18'), thence 
North 3.57 chains (235.62'), thence West 2 chains (132.00'), 
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thence North 0°50f West 1.69 chains (111.54'), thence West 1.35 
chains (89.10'), thence North 4.28 chains (282.48') , thence North 
70°30' West 10.29 chains (679.14'), thence South 4°32' West 8.70 
chains (574.20'), thence South 59°03' East 11.12 chains (739.86'), 
thence South 1.77 chains (96.43') to the place of beginning, 
containing approximately 17 acres. (Addendum of the Appellants 
Exhibit 5). 
On its face, the Jensen Survey shows that the "Ault deed does not close." 
(Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 7). The warranty deed to the Aults property is 
"SUBJECT TO...the rights of parties in possession and to all existing easements and 
rights of way." All of the courses in the warranty deed to Aults are defined except the 
last course. The last course in the warranty deed to Aults reads: "thence south 1.77 
chains to the place of beginning." 
Part of the disputed property consists of a strip of land (highlighted in yellow) 
approximately 30 feet wide by 553 feet long (hereinafter "the strip"). The north side 
of the strip is marked by a fence which begins at the county road and runs west to a 
point approximately 26 feet from the Aults' west border and then turns northward. 
From this point the fence runs north for approximately 115 feet and then on an angle 
northwest. The resulting piece is known as the "western parcel" (highlighted in 
orange), which is also in dispute. 
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Figure 1 - Jensen Survey 
The Jensen Survey correctly shows the fence between the premises occupied by 
the Aults and the Holdens. The fence shown on the Jensen Survey was in existence 
prior to June 15, 1972 and has been in existence for at least sixty nine (69) years and 
for as long as residents of Vernon can remember (R. 369, 515; Addendum of the 
Appellants Exhibit 7). 
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The Holdens have been in possession of the disputed property since 1969 (R. 
515). The disputed property is correctly described in the Jensen Survey as follows: 
Beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the Southwest corner of 
the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 29 in 
Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence East 9.10 chains (600.60'), to the center of the county road, 
thence North along the center of said County Road thirty feet (30'), 
more or less, to the Boundary Fence, thence Westerly along said 
Boundary Fence 9.10 chains (600.60') to a point north of the place 
of beginning, thence South forty-five feet (45') more or less, to the 
place of beginning. (The strip). 
and 
Beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the Southwest corner of 
the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 29 in 
Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence North two hundred forty feet (240'), more or less, to a 
fence line shown on the Jensen Survey, thence South 59°03' East 
along said fence line thirty-seven feet (37'), more or less, to an 
angle in the fence, thence South one hundred fifteen feet (115'), 
more or less, to said Boundary Fence, thence West along said 
Boundary Fence thirty feet (30'), more or less, to an intersection 
with the first call. (The western parcel). 
During a period in the 1970's, the Aults' property was leased to a party by the 
name of DuBois for a boys ranch, which resulted in a lawsuit between the Aults and 
DuBois. 
The Aults obtained a survey in connection with the lawsuit with DuBois, which 
survey, together with what the Aults already knew, led the Aults to believe that the 
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description to the property in the Warranty Deed dated June 15, 1972, extended 
approximately 30 feet south of the Boundary Fence shown on the Jensen Survey. 
The Aults, subsequent to filing the Complaint, obtained two deeds from the 
Gowans dated February 8, 1999. It is the Aults' erroneous position that the recently 
obtained deeds from Gowans "close the description of the Ault property." 
The Aults constructed a wooden rail fence on their property, more than fifteen 
years ago, subsequent to the DuBois lawsuit, consisting of three wooden 2x8 rails (the 
"Rail Fence"), secured on posts, and painted white. The fence was constructed by Leo 
Ault, personally. The Aults' Rail Fence ends at the line of the old fence line between 
the premises occupied by Holdens shown on the Jensen Survey, and does not include 
the disputed property. 
The Aults planted coniferous trees along the fence line between the Aults' 
property and property occupied by Holdens over a period of fifteen years, more or less. 
There are presently 5 or 6 trees along the fence line. There were formerly several 
additional trees planted by Ault along the fence line, but some have died. The trees 
were planted by the Aults, personally. The coniferous trees planted by the Aults are 
located along the fence line between the premises occupied by the Holdens shown on 
the Jensen Survey, and none of them are on the Holdens1 side of the fence. 
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The main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Aults' property was 
installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975. Pipes for the irrigation system on 
the Aults' property end at the Boundary Fence. 
On Thanksgiving Eve, November 25, 1998, in the dead of night, Leo Ault 
removed the fence marking the east boundary of the premises occupied by Holdens as 
shown on the Jensen Survey, and admitted having done so to Deputy Tooele County 
Sheriff Johnson. 
On December 18, 1998, Leo Ault went on the premises occupied by Holdens 
without their consent, and, with two male assistants, resorted to "self help" by 
attempting to further remove and destroy the boundary fence shown on the Jensen 
Survey, without asking for the assistance of the above-entitled Court, jurisdiction of 
which was invoked by the Aults by the filing of their Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in this matter. There 
is no material dispute in the facts and the legal conclusions made by Judge Young were 
correct. 
The trial court was correct in awarding title to the disputed property to the 
Holdens pursuant to boundary by aquiesence. The elements of boundary by 
acquiescence are (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long period of 
12 
time, (4) by adjoining land owners. The Aults concede that the first and fourth 
elements were established. 
The trial court found that the parties acquiesced to the fence as the boundary 
line. In support of this finding, the court made the following findings of facts: (1) Leo 
Ault constructed a wooden rail fence on his property, more than fifteen years ago, 
which ends at the line of the old fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens, 
and does not include the disputed property; (2) the Aults planted coniferous trees along 
the fence line between the Ault property and property occupied by Holdens over a 
period of fifteen years, more or less, and none of them are on the Holdens1 side of the 
fence; (3) the main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Ault property was 
installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975, and the pipes for the irrigation 
system on the Ault property end at the Boundary Fence; (4) in the mid-80fs, the 
Holdens built a shed on the disputed property, but the Aults did nothing; (5) the Aults 
were aware that the fence was not the legal boundary line at various times, but "did not 
seek to oust the Holdens from occupying the disputed property;" 
The Aults argument is that the parties did not acquiesce to the fence as the 
boundary line because the parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they 
know the location of the true boundary. However, the parties can acquiesce to the 
fence as a boundary even if they know, or should know, the location of the true 
boundary. In this case, the facts are clear that the Aults came to know, at some point, 
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that the fence was not the true boundary. Yet through their indolence, the Aults 
acquiesced to the fence as a boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for 
almost thirty years and even built structures on the property in the 1980fs, yet the Aults 
did nothing. 
The trial court was correct ruling in the Aults' deed was insufficient to convey 
title. The Jensen survey declares on its face that the "Ault deed does not close" by 
more than 100 feet. Thus, the Aults' deed describes nothing at all, and certainly 
nothing adverse to or inconsistent with Holdens1 prior recorded title. It merely 
describes a line, which makes various courses through the farmlands surrounding 
Vernon, failing to come back to the point of beginning. 
The pleadings establish that the Holden deed was dated March 23, 1973, and 
recorded April 9, 1973. The Ault deed was dated June 15, 1972, but was not recorded 
until August 22, 1975. Therefore, under Utah's "race to the registry" system, the 
Holden deed prevails as to any conflict between the two. Examination of the Holdens' 
deed will disclose that it contains several calls which are not tied to metes and bounds 
descriptions, but to natural monuments on the ground. The east boundary runs to the 
edge of and north along the county road. The north boundary is tied to the boundary of 
the Plant property, predecessor in interest to Ault. The pleadings establish that in 
1973, and before that from at least 1969, and for more than sixty-nine years according 
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to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the north boundary of the Plant property was 
the boundary fence. 
The Aults' other causes of action fail because the disputed property was 
rightfully possessed by the Holdens. An order which awards title of the disputed 
property to the Holdens and then finds that they trespassed on that property would be 
completely illogical. The tort of tresspass is totally inconsistent with the doctine of 
boundary by acquiesence. The causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment 
concern the same allegations that the Holdens used the water and pipes which were on 
the disputed property. The factual basis consists of some vague allegations in the 
complaint. Essentially, the Aults argue that the Holdens stole the pipe and water which 
was on the disputed property, which seems to contradict the doctine of boundary by 
acquiesence. There was no merit to these claims both factually and considering the 
courts ruling on the issue of title to the disputed property. 
The trial courts' findings and order support the award of attorney fees and the 
order should be affirmed. There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the finding that the Aults' claim lacked merit and that the claim was asserted in 
bad faith. The record is replete with evidence of bad faith and lack of merit, including 
(1) filing a complaint to quiet while having a deed which failed to close and was subject 
to the rights of parties in possession, the Holdens, (2) the complaint, together with the 
answers to discovery, establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence in favor of 
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the Holdens, (3) the record shows that the Aults' resorted to self-help prior to the 
filing of the complaint and resorted to self-help a second time after the filing of the 
complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the trial court, by going on the property 
and removing and altering the fences, (4) the trial court entered a temporary restraining 
order as a result of the Aults attempts at self-help which direct them to not go on the 
property or disturb the fences, (5) the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going 
on the property and attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an 
order to show cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt, (6) the Aults 
conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs, and (7) before the 
filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could not afford to fight a 
quiet title action (R. 566). 
The trial court was correct in accepting the memorandum of costs as 
timely and legally sufficient. The Holdens likewise acted diligently and were not at 
fault for filing their memorandum late. The "Ruling" was entered and mailed by the 
clerk on July 18, 2000 to Parker Nielsen, who had withdrawn from the case. The 
Holdens actually received a copy of the "Ruling" on July 26, 2000 and then filed a 
memorandum of costs within the five day period after receiving notice. The Holdens 
complied with the five-day time period for filing the memorandum of costs when 
considering the facts of this case in the light of the Utah Supreme Courts decision in 
Board ofComm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997). 
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Rule 54(d)(2) requires that the Holdens file a memorandum "duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred." Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
meet this requirement exactly. The memorandum was verified and the affiant clearly 
stated that the costs were necessarily incurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING THE 
PARCELS TO THE HOLDENS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981). (See also Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990); Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 
993 P. 2d 229 (Utah App. 1999). Goodman held that to establish ownership of a 
disputed parcel there must be (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences, or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long 
period of time, (4) by adjoining land owners. The Aults concede that the first and 
fourth elements were established (R. 489, Brief of Appellants 21). 
A. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
The trial court found that the parties acquiesced to the fence as the boundary 
line. In support of this finding, the court made the following findings of facts: 
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1. The Aults constructed a wooden rail fence on his property, more 
than fifteen years ago, subsequent to the DuBois lawsuit, consisting of three wooden 
2x8 rails (the "Rail Fence"), secured on posts, and painted white. The fence was 
constructed by Leo Ault, personally. The Ault's Rail Fence ends at the line of the old 
fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens shown on the Jensen Survey, and 
does not include the disputed property. (R. 489, 515). 
2. The Aults planted coniferous trees along the fence line between the 
Ault property and property occupied by Holdens over a period of fifteen years, more or 
less. There are presently 5 or 6 trees along the fence line. There were formerly several 
additional trees planted by the Aults along the fence line, but some have died. The 
trees were planted by the Aults, personally. The coniferous trees planted by the Aults 
are located along the fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens shown on 
the Jensen Survey, and none of them are on the Holdens' side of the fence. (R. 489, 
515). 
3. The main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Ault 
property was installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975. Pipes for the 
irrigation system on the Ault property end at the Boundary Fence. (R. 489, 515). 
4. Sometime in the mid-80's, the Holdens built a shed on the disputed 
property, but the Aults did nothing. (R. 489). 
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5. The Aults were aware that the fence was not the legal boundary 
line at various times, but "did not seek to oust the Holdens from occupying the disputed 
property." (R. 489). 
The Aults argument is that the parties did not acquiesce to the fence as the 
boundary line because (1) the fence was not built to be boundary, (2) the parties cannot 
acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they know the location of the true boundary, 
and (3) it is not acquiescence if the Aults granted permission for the use of the 
property. 
1. The fence was not built to be boundary. 
The Holdens acknowledge that the fence was not built to be a boundary. This 
fence was built approximately 69 years ago, before either the Aults or the Holdens 
possessed their parcels. In many cases the original purpose of the fence is an important 
factor. However, in this case the original purpose of the fence is irrelevant. The trial 
court in no way relied upon this fact in making its ruling. 
2. The parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they know the 
location of the true boundary. 
The Aults cited Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah 
App. 1999) for the proposition that the parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a 
boundary if they know the location of the true boundary. Wilkinson quoted Nunley v. 
Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962), when it stated "that if there is no uncertainty as to 
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the location of the true boundary line the parties may not, knowing where the true 
boundary line is, establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place. * 
Although this is persuasive language, this interpretation of the law does not hold 
up when compared to other cases. The law of boundary by acquiescence has shifted 
and evolved significantly over the past forty years. Nunley was written in 1962 when 
uncertainty of the boundary line appeared to be essential to a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. However, in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly held that objective uncertainty of the boundary line is not an 
element of boundary by acquiescence. 
Furthermore, to hold that uncertainty of the true boundary line is an element of 
the doctrine contradicts the "indolence" cases. In Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801, 
806 (Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
[According to [Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973)], a 
landowner may acquiesce to a boundary through "indolence." And while 
"indolence" has no agreed-upon legal definition, it is generally defined as 
"laziness or inactivity arising from a love of ease or aversion to work; 
indisposition to labor." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1154 (1986). Therefore, landowners may acquiesce to a boundary through 
idleness or laziness. In other words, a landowner whose property has been 
encroached upon acquiesces to the boundary when he or she "either had 
or should have had knowledge that his [or her] property was being 
claimed by another. 
Therefore, the parties can acquiesce to the fence as a boundary even if they 
know, or should know, the location of the true boundary. In this case, the facts are 
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clear that the Aults came to know, at some point, that the fence was not the true 
boundary. Yet, through their indolence, the Aults acquiesced to the fence as a 
boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for almost thirty years and even 
built structures on the property in the 1980's, yet the Aults did nothing. 
3. It is not acquiescence if the Aults granted permission for the use of the 
property. 
The facts indicate that the Holdens did lease the Aults' property from 1972 to 
1977 for farming (R. 260, 688-83). However, this lease was terminated more than 
twenty years ago. The trial court found that the mutual acquiescence occurred from 
"not less than 1978 to 1998." (R. 489, 487). The Aults have tried to characterize the 
Holdens' management of the Aults' property over various periods of time from 1982 to 
1997 as a lease and, therefore, permissive use. The Aults argue that the Holdens 
managed the Aults' entire parcel in exchange for one-half of the crops raised. (R. 685-
84, lines 20-25). However, there are no credible facts which support that any lease 
existed for the disputed property. The purpose of the lease or management agreement 
was for farming. However, there were never any crops raised on the disputed 
property. In reality, the 1972-77 lease and the later so-called lease never involved the 
disputed properties. The "leases" concerned the farming areas of the Aults' property. 
The Aults try to equate Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999) to this 
case. Edgell was about someone giving oral permission to leave a picnic table which 
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rested over the property line. The facts of Edgell hardly equate to the Aults allowing 
the Holdens to build a shed on the disputed property. The Aults never gave express 
permission for the Holdens to possess the disputed property, let alone to build 
structures on the property. The Aults characterize their actions as granting permissive 
use to the Holdens, when reality is that their behavior was pure "indolence." 
B. For a long period of time (at least 20 years). 
The trial court found that the mutual acquiescence occurred from "not less than 
1978 to 1998/' (R. 489, 487). The facts indicate that the Holdens did lease the Aults' 
property from 1972 to 1977 (R. 260, 688-83). As was argued above, the Holdens 
were in possession of the disputed property for more than twenty years. The disputed 
property was never part of the 1972-77 lease or the later lease or management 
agreement involving the farming areas of the property, and therefore, the use of the 
property was not permissive. The Holdens occupation of the property far exceeded the 
twenty year requirement. 
The trial court was correct in finding that no material issues of fact existed and 
that all four requirements of boundary by acquiesence were met. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT AULTS' 
DEED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVEY TITLE. 
A. Failure of Aults' Deed to Close. 
The Jensen survey declares on its face that the " Ault deed does not close." 
(Addendum of Appellants Ehibit 7). Reference to the survey discloses that the lack of 
closure is by more than 100 feet. Thus, the Aults' deed describes nothing at all, and 
certainly nothing adverse to or inconsistent with Holdens1 prior recorded title. It 
merely describes a line, which makes various courses through the farmlands 
surrounding Vernon, failing to come back to the point of beginning. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that an "indenture's language 
describing the conveyed land [which] is imprecise" fails to "convey title to the disputed 
land." Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324 (Utah 1998), citing with approval, Coleman v. 
Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) ("It is not to be questioned that in order to 
be valid, a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description to identify the property 
it conveys.") The Ault deed is imprecise and, therefore, fails to "convey title to the 
disputed land." 
The authoritative American Law of Property (1952) declares the controlling 
principle at § 12.46 "that an instrument should be held ineffective as a conveyance if it 
fails to show on its face, or by reference, the particular land to which it relates." 
Elaborating at Id, § 12.105, p.413: 
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In order that a description may have the certainty necessary 
for validity, there must be a complete set of boundaries. 
Even a plat is insufficient if it leaves the extent of a lot 
undetermined for lack of a boundary on one side. 
Accordingly, a description by metes and bounds, whether 
along natural or artificial boundaries or by courses and 
distances, must be by continuous lines, one commencing 
where the other leaves off and the final line returning to the 
point of beginning. If the description does not "close." 
either expressly or by construction, the grant fails for lack 
of coverage of any tract of land." (Footnotes omitted, 
emphasis added.) 
Utah has given the principle announced by the American Law of Property literal 
effect. Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 193, 367 P.2d 193 (1962) held a metes and 
bounds description ineffective to convey title because of a failure to close. Figure 2, 
taken from the published report of the Howard case, shows plotted lines very similar to 
those of the Ault deed, as plotted by the Jensen Survey. The district court held the 
"warranty deed a nullity for failure to convey anything" and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed, stating that the "grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably 
determinable. However, we consider that under the facts here a grant is not 
sustainable. Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in mind or, 
conjecture indulged, one would have to divine that any number of areas could be said to 
have been intended." The Ault's name need only be substituted for Howard's and the 
Howard case describes the facts herein, precisely. 
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Figure 2: Plat from Howard v. Howard. 
B. Words "to the place of beginning" Fail to Salvage the Ault Deed. 
The lack of closure in the Ault deed shown by the Jensen Survey, immediately 
west of the barn, in the very spot where Ault removed Holdens' fence on Thanksgiving 
Eve, is neither trivial nor susceptible of any reasonable construction that would salvage 
the deed. The Aults' contend that the description is completed by the phrase "to the 
place of the beginning." Reference to the Jensen Survey (Figure 1) demonstrates that 
extension of the final call could not "close" the description. It would merely continue 
the final call south, never returning to the point of beginning. 
In addition, the Aults' deny that there is any mistake in their deed, by their 
answer to 2d Interrogatories No. 10, as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO, 10: Is it your claim or 
contention that there is a mistake in the Ault deed alleged in 
paragraph 3 of the complaint? 
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ANSWER:... .Plaintiffs do not contend that there was a 
mistake in the Ault deed alleged in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. (R.263). 
Therefore, the deed fails (1) because it fails to close1 and (2) because Utah law 
prohibits its construction to close, by the introduction of parol. 
C. Ault's Deed may not be "Construed" to Close. 
We acknowledge the rule that mutual mistake in deeds may be ignored if the 
intention of the parties can be determined. That doctrine cannot salvage the Ault deed, 
however, for deeds are construed according to the law of contracts, Hansen v. Stichting 
Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Utah 1995) . "[P]arol evidence 
may not contradict, vary, or add to deeds." Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1979). The terms of the deed may not be varied by parol, for "all provisions of the 
prior contract are usually merged into the deed; and when a party denies merger due to 
mistake, he has the burden to show mistake by clear and convincing evidence." Ibid. 
(Italics by the court, citations omitted.) 
"[A] party seeking reformation of a deed due to mutual mistake must plead such 
mistake with particularity" pursuant to Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ibid. 
1
 Ault relied upon Lossee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132 (Utah 1951) at the September 27, 1999, 
hearing, dealing with "mutual mistake" under common conveyances to the heirs of Alice Ann 
Jones. The case is inapposite, for Ault has disclaimed "mistake" and for further reason that Ault 
and Holden do not hold under common conveyances from the same grantee. Lossee v. Jones 
defeats the contention of Ault, in any event, for it held that inclusion of the words "more or less" 
in the final call "constitute a tolerance factor which enables the extension of the final distance" so 
that the deed closed. The Ault deed does not contain the words "more or less." 
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Ault has not done so and, moreover, affirmatively denied at 2d Interrogatories 110 that 
there was any mistake. (R. 263). 
Even if mistake had been alleged, and could be considered by the Court, the 
issue, we submit, must be resolved by reference to the boundary fence. American Law 
of Property relies upon the early case of Park v. Wilkinson, 60 Pac. 945 (Utah 1900), 
where a deed failed to close because one course extended to the center of Canyon 
Creek, but the course stated was 66 feet short of Canyon Creek. The Utah court held 
that "[t]he natural monuments [v/z., Canyon Creek] govern and control the other 
description." The Holden deed is therefore controlled by the natural monuments on the 
grounds, referred to in the deed, and any construction of the Ault deed must also be 
controlled by the natural monuments on the ground, in this case the boundary fence. 
D. The Holden Deed Describes the Property and is Prior in Time. 
The pleadings establish that the Holden deed was dated March 23, 1973, and 
recorded April 9, 1973. The Ault deed was dated June 15, 1972, but was not recorded 
until August 22, 1975. Therefore, under Utah's "race to the registry" system, the 
Holden deed prevails as to any conflict between the two. 
Holden took possession of the disputed property in 1969, prior to his 1973 deed, 
under a lease from Joyce Sharp. The boundary fence, in its original location, is shown 
on the Jensen Survey. Holden has thus held the property, bounded by the fence line, 
for thirty (30) years, and it was in existence when Aults acquired their property. 
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Examination of the Holdens' deed will disclose that it contains several calls 
which are not tied to metes and bounds descriptions, but to natural monuments on the 
ground. The east boundary runs to the edge of and north along the county road. The 
north boundary is tied to the boundary of the Plant property, predecessor in interest to 
Ault. The pleadings establish that in 1973, and before that from at least 1969, and for 
more than sixty-nine years according to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the 
north boundary of the Plant property was the boundary fence. 
These facts are confirmed by the survey of D. Rosenberg, dated November 1, 
1969. The Rosenberg survey establishes not only that the Holden deed described the 
disputed property but that the location of the boundary fence was in precisely same 
place in 1969 that it is today, as confirmed by the Jensen Survey, the Pehrson statement 
and by the Aults' admissions. 
The uniform real estate contract of Aults in 1962 does not alter the facts. Such a 
contract is not a conveyance. "While the vendee under such a contract is considered to 
be the equitable owner, the legal title is in the vendor until the contract is performed 
and a conveyance executed" and the contract "raises no legal inference that possession 
of the property is to be given before the deed is to be executed." Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 
423 P.2d 491, 494 (Utah 1967), quoting from 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 
385 at p. 808. Accord., Wiscombe v. Lockhart, 608 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1980), 
holding that "[t]itle to the property remained in [the seller]," citing Jeffs v. Citizens 
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Finance Co., 7 Utah 2d 106, 319 P.2d 858 (1958), explaining that "the assignee of a 
real estate contract securing a loan may elect whether to perform the real estate contract 
or not." On the facts herein, the real estate contract, even if it could be considered, 
would not alter the defects in Auks' title, for reference to it reveals that it contains the 
same description, the same failure to close, and the same provision that it is subject to 
rights of parties in possession. 
E. The Boundary Fence Placed Aults on Notice of Holdens' Claim of Title. 
It is uncontroverted and agreed that the warranty deed of Aults is dated June 15, 
1972, and recorded August 22, 1975. Further agreed is that the Boundary Fence has 
been in existence since prior to June 15, 1972. The law is clear in such circumstances 
that the Ault deed is subject to actual notice of claims of parties in possession as 
evidenced by the boundary fence. Nix v. Tooele County, 118 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
1941), holding the purchaser subject to notice of "facts which would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge" of an adverse 
claim of title. Accord., Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983); McGarry v. 
Thompson, 201 P.2d 288 (Utah 1948) ("because such occupancy was sufficient to put a 
reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, and such inquiry would have led to actual 
knowledge of the rights under which the defendants held possession, and of the state of 
the title.") 
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A variant of estoppel, a claimant is barred by inaction when there is a duty to 
act. Utah State Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d 763 
(Utah 1943). Accord., Hilton v. Sloan, 108 Pac. 689 (Utah 1910) ("preventing] a 
party from taking dishonest and unconscientious advantage of his strict legal 
rights... .consistently with good faith and practice") "[Principles of equity and justice 
are universal [and] they apply wherever appropriate and necessary to enforce rights or 
to prevent oppression and injustice." Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah 1976) See also, Blackhurst v. Transamerica, 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985); 
Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988) The doctrine is 
established herein by Holdens' long, quiet possession of the disputed property and 
erection of substantial improvements thereon, including the shed, exercise and 
motorcycle repair facility. 
F. Deeds from Gowans Fail to Close the Deed to Ault. 
The Aults1 Answers to Holdens1 2d Interrogatories also explode the alternate 
contention that two deeds obtained from Gowans close the description to the Ault 
property. The two deeds reveal that they are quit claim deeds dated February 8, 1999. 
(R. 259-58). Holdens held title to the very property described in the Gowans deed of 
February 8, 1999, under a deed from Gowans dated February 26, 1976. The quit 
claim deeds of February 8, 1999, were thus executed more than 1 year and 2 months 
after filing of the Complaint-by persons who are apparent strangers to title. Certainly 
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they are not executed by the grantors as the Aults allege. The Jensen survey illustrates 
that the Go wans deed could not "close" Aults' description, for Holdens hold title to a 
triangular piece between the end of Aults' final call and the place of beginning. 
This Court needs no citation of authority for the proposition that a quit claim 
deed from a stranger to title conveys nothing. Neither is authority needed that a quit 
claim deed from a stranger is not a correction of the deed of a record owner, or 
correction of a deed alleged in the Complaint. 
m . NO MATERIAL DISPUTES OF FACT EXISTED WITH RESPECT 
TO THE AULTS' OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The Aults' other causes of action fail because the disputed property was 
rightfully possessed by the Holdens. An order which awards title of the disputed 
property to the Holdens and then finds that they trespassed on that property would be 
completely illogical. The tort of tresspass is totally inconsistent with the doctine of 
boundary by acquiesence. If a party can be awarded title to property by the doctine of 
boundary by acquiesence and then be sued for trespass, the doctine of boundary by 
acquiesence would become void, as a practical matter. 
The causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment concern the same 
allegations that the Holdens used the water and pipes which were on the disputed 
property. However, the factual basis for these claims is very weak. The factual basis 
consists of some vague allegations in the complaint. No discernable discovery was 
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undertaken to establish these claims. Essentially, the Aults argue that the Holdens stole 
the pipe and water which was on the disputed property, which seems to contradict the 
doctine of boundary by acquiesence. There was no merit to these claims both factually 
and considering the courts ruling on the issue of title to the disputed property. 
IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING 
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE AULTS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith " 
In this case, the Aults argue that because the Memorandum of Decision issued 
by Judge Young did not mention the award of attorney fees that, therefore, it was not 
Judge Young's intention to award attorney fees. It is clear from the record that Judge 
Young reviewed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 515) and the 
Summary Judgment (R. 517). He reviewed the objections by the Aults and specifically 
denied them. (R. 508). Furthermore, the request for costs and fees was not a surprise. 
The Holdens requested "their costs and expenses" in the answer to the complaint (R. 
22-16). 
There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that 
the Aults' claim lacked merit and that the claim was asserted in bad faith. The Holdens 
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are not asserting that the award of attorney fees was granted simply because summary 
judgment was granted, nor that it should be denied because boundary by acquiescence 
is a complicated area of the law. The Holdens were granted an award of attorney fees 
because of the behavior of the Aults. 
The record is replete with evidence of bad faith and lack of merit. First, the 
Aults' complaint shows, on its face, that they were without title for the dual reasons 
that the conveyance alleged failed to close and, if it had, was subject to the rights of 
parties in possession, the Holdens. Pursuit of a complaint not even alleging title, the 
basic and first element of any quiet title action is the epitome of lack of merit. Second, 
the Aults' complaint, together with the answers to discovery, establish the elements of 
boundary by acquiescence in favor of the Holdens. Third, the record shows that the 
Aults' resorted to self-help prior to the filing of the complaint and resorted to self-help 
a second time after the filing of the complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the 
trial court, by going on the property and removing and altering the fences. (R. 249, 
515). Fourth, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order as a result of the 
Aults attempts at self-help which direct them to not go on the property or disturb the 
fences. (R. 62, 208). Fifth, the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going on the 
property and attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an order to 
show cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt. (R. 155). Sixth, the Aults 
conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs. (R.557). Seventh, 
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before the filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could not 
afford to fight a quiet title action (R. 566). 
The trial courts' findings and order support the award of attorney fees and the 
order should be affirmed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING COSTS. 
A. The Memorandum was timely filed. 
Ruled 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a memorandum 
of costs must be filed within five days of entry of the judgment. However, in Board of 
Comm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the District Judges' order granting an extension of time to file a 
memorandum of costs. In the Petersen case, the Bar did not find out about the 
judgment until nine days after it was entered because of some clerical errors in the 
district court office. When the Bar found out about the judgment, it filed a 
memorandum of costs and a request for an extension of time. The Court recognized 
that the Bar had acted diligently and that the late filing of the memorandum of costs was 
not the fault of the Bar. 
In this case, the Holdens likewise acted diligently and were not at fault for filing 
their memorandum late. The "Ruling" was entered and mailed by the clerk on July 18, 
2000. However, the clerk mailed the "Ruling" to Parker Nielsen, who had withdrawn 
from the case. (R. 508). The Holdens actually received a copy of the "Ruling" on July 
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26, 2000. (R. 547-44). The Holdens filed a memorandum of costs within the five day 
period after receiving notice. The Holdens, acting pro se, did not request an extension 
of time when they filed their memorandum of costs on August 1, 2000, but later filed a 
request for an extension of time. 
The Holdens have complied with the five day time period for filing the 
memorandum of costs when considering the facts of this case in the light of the Utah 
Supreme Courts decision in Petersen. The Holdens found out about the "Ruling" eight 
days after it was entered through no fault of their own. Upon finding out about the 
"Ruling", the Holdens acted diligently in filing the memorandum of costs. 
B. The memorandum complies with the requirements of Rule 54(d)(2). 
Rule 54(d)(2) requires that the Holdens file a memorandum "duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred." Holdens' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
meets this requirement exactly. The memorandum was verified and the affiant clearly 
stated that the costs were necessarily incurred. The Aults argue that the memorandum 
of costs must contain more than what the clear language of the stature requires. 
The Aults are well aware of the depositions in this case and their necessity in 
establishing the underlying facts supporting the Holdens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The costs were outlined in the bills submitted as part of the memorandum of 
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costs. In fact, when Judge Young denied the Holdens Motion on the Pleadings, he 
suggested that further discovery was needed. 
The trial court was correct in accepting the memorandum of costs as timely and 
legally sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully request that the order 
granting summary judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this j S day of January, 2001. 
S&)tt A. Broadhead -
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Ruling 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEO H AULT, 
vs, 
Plaintiff, 
DARRELL C. HOLDEN, 
Defendant 
RULING 
Case No: 980300772 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Date: 07/18/2000 
Clerk: lucilleh 
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Objections to 
the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court 
having fully considered the objections, denies Respondent's 
Objections and request for oral argument. The Court entered and 
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the 
Order of Summary Judgment this 12th day of July, 2000. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980300772 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PARKER NIELSON 
PAYOR 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mail WILLIAM J. HANSEN 
ATTORNEY 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
1500 Key Bank Tower 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84144 
Dated this )^day of hjjLt ^rs 20 &£_ 
e GL-.M. 
Deputy Court Cler 
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